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Introduction and summary
A classic question facing macroeconomists is: How
does an increase in government purchases affect the
economy? Our interest in this question is motivated
by the desire to evaluate the properties of different
rules and institutions for setting fiscal policy. For
example, should government purchases vary system-
atically over the business cycle? What would the mac-
roeconomic consequences of a balanced budget
amendment be? What would the effect of a perma-
nent decline in defense purchases be on aggregate
employment and real wages? If we had observations
on otherwise identical economies operating under the
different fiscal policies that we are interested in evalu-
ating, it would be easy to answer these types of ques-
tions. But we do not. So we have no choice but to at-
tack them within the confines of economic models.
Which model should we use? We have at our dis-
posal a plethora of competing business cycle models,
each of which incorporates different views of the way
the economy functions and makes different recom-
mendations for macroeconomic policy. So ones views
about the costs and benefits of different policy pro-
posals depends critically on the model being used to
assess the proposal. In this sense, research aimed at
assessing the empirical plausibility of competing
models is a crucial input to the policy process. One
approach for choosing among competing models is
to compare their predictions for the consequences of
a shock for which we know how the actual economy
responds.1 To the extent that different models give
rise to different predictions, some will be counterfac-
tual and can be eliminated from the field of choice.
Shocks to government spending are likely to be
useful in this regard. This is because many models
give rise to different predictions for the effects of an
increase in government purchases on real wages and
average labor productivity (output per man hour).
Neoclassical models of the sort discussed in Barro
(1981),  Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992)
and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998) assume
constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
Models of this sort predict that real wages fall after
an exogenous increase in government purchases,
that is, after a change in government purchases that
was not caused by other developments in the econo-
my. For reasons discussed below, other models which
deviate from the assumptions embedded in the neo-
classical model generate different predictions. For
example, models embodying increasing returns and
imperfect competition of the sort considered by
Devereaux, Head, and Lapham (1996) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992) predict that real wages ought to
rise. Which of the two predictions is correct?
Competing business cycle models also give rise
to different predictions for how average labor produc-
tivity responds to an increase in government pur-
chases. For example, some authors assume that aver-
age productivity of firms depends on the level of
aggregate economic activity (for example, Baxter and
King, 1992 and Farmer, 1993). Others assume that
increasing returns to scale occur at the firm level (see
Farmer, 1993). These models predict that average labor
productivity should rise after an exogenous increase
in government purchases. This prediction also emerges
in models that allow for labor hoarding and variable
capital utilization rates (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo, 1993 and Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996).
Standard neoclassical models with constant returns
to scale production functions (Aiyagari, Christiano,
and Eichenbaum, 1992) predict that average labor30 Economic Perspectives
productivity should fall. As with real wages, the key
question is: Which prediction is correct?
The major difficulty in answering this question
is identifying exogenous changes to government pur-
chases. Simply observing what happens to real wages
and average labor productivity after government pur-
chases change does not reveal the effects of the
changes in government purchases per se. This is be-
cause government purchases themselves are affected
by developments in the private economy, say because
of attempts to stabilize the business cycle. In these
cases movements in real wages and average labor
productivity confound the effect of government
purchases and the factors that caused those purchases
to change.
Various approaches for identifying exogenous
changes in government purchases have been pursued
in the literature.2 Here, we build on the approach used
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Ramey and
Shapiro (1997) who focus on exogenous movements
in defense spending as a proxy for exogenous move-
ments in total government purchases. To isolate such
movements, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify three
political events that led to large military build ups
which were arguably unrelated to developments in the
domestic U.S. economy: the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, and the CarterReagan military build up. We re-
fer to these events as RameyShapiro episodes. As
in Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998), our basic
strategy is to document the behavior of various macro
aggregates after the onset of the RameyShapiro
episodes, controlling for other developments in the
U.S. economy.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.3
First, aggregate output and employment rise after an
increase in government purchases. Second, real wages
fall after an increase in government purchases. This
is true across a broad range of real wage measures,
including the measure used by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) who argued that real wages rise
after a positive shock to government purchases. Third,
there is mixed evidence regarding the response of av-
erage labor productivity to a positive shock in govern-
ment purchases: It falls in the manufacturing sector
but rises in the private business sector as a whole.
Our first finding is consistent with the predictions
of all the models discussed above. Our second find-
ing casts doubt on the empirical plausibility of the
class of business cycle models which predict that real
wages rise after an increase in government purchas-
es. Our third finding suggests that it is premature to
eliminate any of the competing models based on the
response of average productivity to a shock in gov-
ernment purchases.
In the next section, we summarize some compet-
ing models and their predictions for the response of
real wages and average productivity to a shock in
government purchases. Then we assess the empirical
plausibility of these models by analyzing what actual-
ly happens after a shock to government purchases.
Shocks to product demand
and the labor market
Two of the many dimensions along which com-
peting business cycle models differ are their assump-
tions about the degree of competition in product mar-
kets and the degree to which households internalize
increases in tax liabilities associated with changes in
government purchases. These differences give rise to
different predictions for the response of real wages
and average productivity to an increase in govern-
ment purchases.
Neoclassical models assume that, at least to a
first approximation, 1) product and labor markets are
perfectly competitive, 2) if a firm increased the input
of all its factors of production by a given percentage,
then its output would rise by the same percentage,
that is, output is produced using a constant returns
to scale technology, and 3) in the short run, due to
some factors of production being in fixed supply, the
increase in output that results from hiring an additional
worker, that is, the marginal product of labor, declines
in the amount of labor hired.4
The first assumption implies that it is optimal for
a firm to hire labor until the real wage equals the mar-
ginal product of labor. This rule gives rise to a demand
curve for labor of the type labelled DD in figure 1. This
curve specifies the amount of labor that the typical
firm is willing to hire at any given real wage rate. As-
sumption 3 implies that the demand curve for labor is
downward sloping: Other things equal, an increase in
the real wage rate reduces the firms demand for labor.
According to models embodying assumptions
13, the only factors that shift the market demand
curve for labor are those which affect the marginal
product of labor schedule. An example is a techno-
logical improvement that raises the entire marginal
product of labor schedule. In contrast, an increase in
government purchases or the demand for goods from
overseas has no effect on the marginal product of la-
bor schedule. So, these types of changes would not
affect the demand curve for labor.
We now turn to the supply of labor. Many busi-
ness cycle models assume perfectly competitive labor
markets in which workers decide how much labor to
supply, taking as given the real wage (see King and
Rebelo, 1998, for a review). The representative labor31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
supplier behaves in a way that equates the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of working. The marginal
benefit equals the real wage rate times the marginal
utility of wealth. The marginal cost equals the margin-
al utility of leisure. Under standard assumptions, this
behavior implies that an individuals supply of labor
will be an increasing function of the real wage rate.
This relationship is summarized by the curve, labelled
SS, depicted in figure 1.
Equilibrium in the labor market is depicted in figure
1 by the point E where the labor supply and demand
curves intersect. Shocks to the economy affect em-
ployment and real wages by shifting one or both of
these curves. We have already argued that, in the neo-
classical model, an increase in government purchases
does not affect the demand for labor. So to affect equi-
librium real wages and hours worked, an increase in
government purchases must affect the supply of labor.
It does this by affecting the marginal utility of wealth.
Suppose that individuals are rational, forward
looking, and understand that an increase in the present
value of government purchases raises the present
value of their tax obligations and lowers their after tax
wealth. Other things equal, this raises individuals
marginal utility of wealth and shifts their labor supply
curve to the right.5 Put differently, the fact that indi-
viduals feel poorer because of the rise in their tax
obligation causes them to offer more labor at any given
real wage rate. In Figure 1 the new labor supply curve
is labelled D¢ D¢ . The new equilibrium is depicted by
the point F. It follows that in neoclassical models a
rise in government purchases will lead to a rise in em-
ployment and output but a decline in real wages and
the marginal product of labor.6 For many specifications
of technology, the decline in the marginal product of
labor also implies that average labor productivity falls.
Based on empirical evidence discussed below,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) argue that the pre-
dicted fall in real wages is counterfactual. To remedy
this claimed defect, they abandon the assumption
that firms are perfect competitors in the goods market.
Instead they assume that firms have some market
power and can set price above marginal cost. We
refer to the ratio of price to marginal cost as the markup.
With market power, firms will hire labor up to the point
where the marginal product of labor is equal to the
markup multiplied by the real wage rate.
Note that variations in the markup will affect the
demand for labor just as technological improvements
do. Suppose that a rise in the demand for goods
drives firms markups down, that is, markups behave
in a countercyclical manner. Then the demand curve
for labor will shift to the right, say to D¢ D¢  in figure
1, that is, at a given real wage rate firms will now wish
to hire more labor. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
discuss a variety of models of imperfect competition
in which markups fall when the demand for goods
is high.
For simplicity, suppose that consumers do not
internalize the rise in tax liabilities associated with a
rise in government purchases. Then, only the labor
demand curve will shift in response to an increase in
government purchases. The new equilibrium is depicted
in figure 1 by the point Q. So here an increase in gov-
ernment purchases leads to an increase in real wages
as well as employment and output. As in neoclassical
models, the marginal and average product of labor
falls.7 So the key difference between these models
lies in their prediction for the response of real wages.
Of course one could allow for labor supply effects
in models with imperfect competition, as Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992) do. Under these circumstances,
both the demand and the supply curve would shift to
the right when government purchases rise. Real wag-
es would rise or fall depending on whether the demand
or the supply effect dominated. Given Rotemberg and
Woodfords (1992) assumptions, the demand effect
dominates and real wages rise. This situation is depict-
ed in figure 1 by the point H which lies at the inter-
section of the curves labelled D¢ D¢  and S¢ S¢ .
Other models exist in which the real wage could
rise after an increase in government purchases. For
example, Baxter and King (1992) and Farmer (1993)
discuss models in which perfectly competitive firms
produce output using a technology that exhibits con-
stant returns to scale in firms own factors of produc-
tion. But, unlike all of the models discussed above, it
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is assumed that each firms output is an increasing
function of aggregate output. Now suppose that an
increase in government purchases leads to a shift in
the supply of labor. Given the assumptions in Baxter
and King (1992) and Farmer (1993), the increase in
aggregate output leads to an upward shift in the mar-
ginal product of labor schedule. This in turn shifts
the demand for labor to the right, that is, at every given
real wage rate firms would like to hire more labor. After
all adjustments have been made, the net result will be
a rise in employment and output, and if the externali-
ties are sufficiently large, a rise in the marginal product
of labor, the average product of labor, and real wages.8
Finally, we note that neoclassical models and
models embodying imperfect competition can be modi-
fied to reverse their prediction that average labor pro-
ductivity falls after an increase in government pur-
chases. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (1993) and Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996)
modify a neoclassical model by allowing for labor
hoarding and variable capital utilization. In
their models, labor effort and capacity utiliza-
tion rise after an increase in government
purchases. For example, firms could in-
crease line speeds or add extra shifts. The
result is that in response to an increase in
government purchases, employment, out-
put, and measured average labor produc-
tivity all rise, while real wages continue to
fall. Presumably one could modify Rotemberg
and Woodfords (1992) model in a similar
way to overturn the prediction that mea-
sured average productivity falls after a
positive shock to government purchases.
In sum, competing business cycle
models generate different predictions for
the effects of a shock to government pur-
chases. Next we assess these models by
analyzing what actually happens after a
shock to government purchases.
Identifying exogenous movements
in government purchases
As discussed above, government pur-
chases, Gt, respond to many developments
in the economy. Consequently we must make
assumptions to isolate movements in Gt that
were not caused by the response of the
government to factors affecting the private
economy. Various authors have argued
that defense purchases, gt, are less likely to
respond to private sector developments.
Based on their reading of history and
contemporary news accounts, Ramey and
Shapiro (1997) argue that they are able to isolate
three arguably exogenous events that led to large
military build ups: the Korean War, the Vietnam War,
and the CarterReagan build up. They date these
events at third quarter 1950, first quarter 1965, and
first quarter 1980.9
As background to our analysis, panel A of figure
2 reports the log of real defense expenditures with
vertical lines at the dates of the RameyShapiro epi-
sodes. Panel B of figure 2 reports the share of defense
spending in gross domestic product (GDP). Note that
the time series on real defense expenditures is dominat-
ed by three events: the large increase in real defense
expenditures associated with the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the CarterReagan defense build
up. The RameyShapiro dates essentially mark the
beginning of these episodes.
Various econometric procedures can be used to
exploit the identifying assumption that the Ramey
Shapiro episodes corresponded to the onset of
FIGURE 2
Post World War II U.S. defense purchases
billions of 1992 dollars
A. Defense spending
billions of 1992 dollars
B. Share of defense spending in GDP
Note: The lines in panel A represent Ramey-Shapiro episodes.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
exogenous increases in government purchases. The
procedure that we used is described in box 1. Our ba-
sic strategy is to summarize how the economy
evolves over time using a statistical model which was
estimated using quarterly U.S. data for the first quarter
of 1948 through the fourth quarter of 1988. We chose
this sample period to preserve comparability with
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). Edelberg, Eichen-
baum, and Fisher (1998) present results obtained us-
ing data from the first quarter of 1948 through the
first quarter of 1996.
Given our statistical model, we use a simulation
procedure to estimate how the economy responded
to the onset of a RameyShapiro episode. The simu-
lated response functions which we report below give
the impact of an average increase in defense expendi-
tures, where the average is taken across the three
RameyShapiro episodes. Under our assumptions,
these correspond to an estimate of how the variable
of interest would respond to a similar exogenous in-
crease in government purchases. As a matter of termi-
nology, we refer to the dynamic response of a variable
to the onset of a RameyShapiro episode as the re-
sponse of that variable to a positive shock in govern-
ment purchases.
Empirical results
The response of output and employment
Figure 3 reports our estimates of the dynamic re-
sponse of real defense spending, total government
purchases, and aggregate output to the onset of a
RameyShapiro episode. The black lines display our
point estimates. The colored lines correspond to 68
percent confidence interval bands. Consistent with
results in Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998),
we find that the onset of a RameyShapiro episode
BOX 1
Our econometric procedure
 The statistical procedure that we used can
be described as follows. Define the set of WAR
dummy variables Dt, where Dt = 1 if t = {1950:Q3,
1965:Q1, 1980:Q1} and zero otherwise. Denote by
Xt the time t value of the set of macroeconomic
variables that we are interested in studying. We
assume that Xt consists of a group of k variables
which evolves over time according to:
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Here Ai and Bi, i = 1, ..., L are sets of k x k
matrices and ut is a vector of identically and in-
dependently distributed random variables which
are uncorrelated with Xt-i, i > 0, and Dt-i, i ³ 0.
Equation 1, which is referred to as the vector au-
toregressive representation (VAR) of Xt, describes
how the economy evolves over time as a function
of past history and current shocks to the system.
Given estimates of Ai and Bi, we can estimate the
dynamic response of Xt to a shock in defense ex-
penditures by simulating the system in equation 1
under the assumption that Dt takes on the value
of one. Under our assumptions we can obtain
consistent estimates of these matrices using
equation-by-equation least squares.
Unless otherwise stated, in our analysis the
vector Xt consisted of the log level of time t real
GDP, the net three-month Treasury bill rate, the
log of the producer price index of crude fuel, the
log level of Ramey and Shapiros measure of real
defense purchases, gt, and the log level of the
variable whose response function we are interest-
ed in. In the case of inflation, we include the time
t rate of inflation in Xt.
We computed standard errors for our estimat-
ed response functions using the following boot-
strap Monte Carlo procedure. We constructed
500 time series on the vector Xt as follows. Let
{$ } utt
T
=1 denote the vector of residuals from the
estimated VAR. We constructed 500 sets of new
time series of residuals, {$ () } , uj tt
T
=1   j = 1, ..., 500.
 The tth element of  {$ () } uj tt
T
=1 was selected by
drawing randomly, with replacement, from the set
of fitted residual vectors, {$ () } . uj tt
T
=1  For each
{$ () } uj tt
T
=1 we constructed a synthetic time series
of Xt, denoted {( ) }, Xj tt
T
=1  using the estimated
VAR and the historical initial conditions on Xt. We
then reestimated the VAR using {( ) } Xj tt
T
=1 and
the historical initial conditions, and calculated the
implied impulse response functions for j = 1, ...,
500. For each fixed lag, we calculated the 80th
lowest and 420th highest values of the corre-
sponding impulse response coefficients across all
500 synthetic impulse response functions. The
boundaries of the confidence intervals in the fig-
ures correspond to a graph of these coefficients.34 Economic Perspectives
leads to a large, persistent, hump-shaped rise in real
defense expenditures. These initially rise by about
1 percent, with a peak response of 30 percent roughly
six quarters after the shock. The response of total
real government purchases is similar to that of de-
fense purchases. While the response is smaller, it
is still substantial: Total government purchases rise
in a hump-shaped pattern with a peak response of
12 percent.
Next we consider the response of aggregate out-
put to a shock in government purchases. Paralleling
the rise in defense expenditures, there is a delayed,
hump-shaped response in real GDP, with a peak re-
sponse of about 3.5 percent four quarters after the
shock. The increase in private real GDP, defined as
GDP minus federal, state, and local government pur-
chases, is much smaller, with a peak response of
about 1.8 percent. In their analysis, Rotemberg and
FIGURE 3
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Response of aggregate output to an increase in government purchases
(percentage response to WAR dummy)
A. Defense spending
percent








F. Private value-added GNP
Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which
includes the response variable, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the
Producer Price Index of crude fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response
functions and the colored lines are the 68 percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—response
variable, defense purchases, and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—Treasury bill interest
rate; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—Producer Price Index of crude fuel.
quarters ahead quarters ahead35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Woodford (1992) measure aggregate output using pri-
vate sector value added, defined as real gross national
product (GNP) minus real value added by federal, state,
and local governments. From figure 3 we see that real
GDP, real GNP, and private sector value added respond
in similar ways to a shock in government purchases.
However the peak increase in private sector value
added is considerably larger than the peak increase
in private GDP.
Figure 4 displays the response of employment to
a positive shock in government purchases. Notice
that total private employment rises in a hump-shaped
pattern which parallels the hump-shaped increase in
defense and total government purchases. The response
of employment in the manufacturing sector is qualita-
tively similar to the response of total private employ-
ment but is larger with a peak increase of roughly 5
percent. Employment in both manufacturing durables
FIGURE 4
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Response of employment to an increase in government purchases
(percentage response to WAR dummy)











Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which
includes the response variables, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the
Producer Price Index of crude fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response
functions and the colored lines are the 68 percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—defense
purchases and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—Treasury bill interest rate; and U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—response variables, Producer Price Index of crude fuel.
quarters ahead quarters ahead36 Economic Perspectives
and nondurables grows, with the increase in the first
sector exceeding the increase in the second sector.10
Consistent with Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fishers
(1998) finding that structural investment rises after a
positive shock to government purchases, we see that
employment in the construction sector rises. Finally,
figure 4 indicates that employment by the federal
government also increases.
We conclude, as do Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), Ramey and Shapiro (1997), Blanchard and
Perotti (1998), and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher
(1998), that a positive shock to government purchas-
es leads to a broad-based expansion in aggregate
economic activity, with private output expanding by
less than total output. Since this finding is consistent
with all of the models discussed in the second section
of this article, we cannot use it to discriminate between
them. For that, we must turn to the responses of real
wages and average productivity.
The response of inflation and real wages
All of our measures of the returns to work are
constructed deflating some nominal measure of wages
by a price index. Therefore it is useful to understand
how the different price indexes we use respond to a
shock in government purchases. Figure 5 summarizes
the response functions of four price indexes and the
corresponding inflation rates. These price indexes
are the GDP deflator, the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
the Producer Price Index (PPI), and Rotemberg and
Woodfords (1992) private value added deflator.11
The key result here is that all four price levels and in-
flation rates rise in response to the shock in govern-
ment purchases.
With this as background, we now consider the
way the return to work responds to an exogenous in-
crease in government spending. Figure 6 displays the
response patterns of eight measures of real compen-
sation: compensation in the private business sector
and in the manufacturing sector, each deflated by the
four price indexes discussed above. Two key results
emerge here. First, regardless of which measure we
use, real compensation falls after a positive shock to
government purchases. Second, compensation in the
manufacturing sector falls more than compensation in
the overall private business sector. Therefore compen-
sation falls more in the sectors of the economy expe-
riencing the largest growth in employment after the
shock to government purchases.
Next we consider the response of real wages in
the manufacturing sector. Figure 7 displays the re-
sponse of eight different measures of real wages to a
positive shock in government purchases: before- and
after-tax real wage rates in the manufacturing sector,
calculated using the CPI, the PPI, the GDP deflator,
and the private value added deflator, respectively.12
The key results here are 1) as in Edelberg, Eichenbaum,
and Fisher (1998), every measure of real wages falls
after a positive shock to government purchases, and
2) after-tax real wages fall by more than before-tax real
wages.13 This second result is noteworthy because it
is the after-tax real wage rate that is relevant for as-
sessing the response of labor supply to an increase
in government purchases.
It is worth emphasizing that the real wage mea-
sure, denoted Manufacturing Wages/Private Value
Added, is the same as the one used by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992). These authors argue that real
wages increase after an increase in government pur-
chases. The only difference between our analysis
and theirs is the way exogenous increases in govern-
ment purchases are identified. Like us, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) seek to identify exogenous move-
ments in government purchases with movements in
defense purchases. But their procedure for isolating
exogenous movements in defense purchases is differ-
ent from ours. Specifically, they identify such move-
ments with the error term in a regression of military
purchases on lagged values of itself and the number
of people employed by the military. Edelberg, Eichen-
baum, and Fisher (1998) argue that there are at least
three reasons for being skeptical of regression-based
measures of exogenous shocks to government pur-
chases. First, the estimated innovations may reflect
shocks to the private sector that cause defense con-
tractors to optimally rearrange delivery schedules,
say because of strikes or other developments in the
private sector. Second, private agents and the govern-
ment may know about a planned increase in defense
purchases well before it is recorded in the data. For
example, suppose that the government receives infor-
mation at a particular date that causes it to commit to
a stream of defense purchases in the future. The vari-
ables used in the regression for military purchases
may not contain this information. If this is the case,
then the regression-based procedure would generate,
at best, a polluted measure of exogenous shocks to
government purchases. Finally, inference using regres-
sion-based measures of shocks to government pur-
chases appears to be quite fragile to perturbations in
the sample period used as well as the list of variables
used (see Christiano, 1990).
To see what impact adopting the regression-
based procedure would have on our results, we
adopted as our measure of a shock to defense pur-
chases the error term obtained by regressing gt on
four lags of the log level of real GDP, the net three-
month Treasury bill rate, the log of the Producer Price37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 5
percent
Response of prices and inflation to an increase in government purchases
(percentage response to WAR dummy)
A. Log of GDP deflator
percent
B. Rate of inflation—GDP deflator
percent
C. Log of Consumer Price Index
percent
D. Rate of inflation—Consumer Price Index
Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which includes the
response variable, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the Producer Price Index of crude
fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response functions and the colored lines are the 68
percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—response variables
for the GDP deflator and real private value added, defense purchases and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System—Treasury bill interest rate; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—response variables for the
Producer Price Index, Consumer Price Index, and the Producer Price Index of crude fuel.
quarters ahead quarters ahead
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E. Log of Producer Price Index
percent
F. Rate of inflation—Producer Price Index
percent
G. Log of private value added deflator
percent
H. Rate of inflation—private value added deflator38 Economic Perspectives
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Response of compensation to an increase in government purchases








Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which includes the
response variable, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the Producer Price Index of crude
fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response functions and the colored lines are the 68
percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—response variable,
deflators for PGDP and private value added, defense purchases, and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System—Treasury bill interest rate; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—deflators for the Producer Price
Index and Consumer Price Index, compensation, and the Producer Price Index of crude fuel.






G. Compensation—private business/private value added
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H. Compensation—manufacturing/private value added39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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G. Manufacturing wages—private value added
percent
H. Manufacturing wages—private value added
Before tax After tax
Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which includes the
response variable, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the Producer Price Index of crude
fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response functions and the colored lines are the 68
percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—response variable,
deflators for PGDP and private value added, defense purchases, and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System—Treasury bill interest rate; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—deflators for the Producer Price Index
and Consumer Price Index, wages, and the Producer Price Index of crude fuel; and Fairlie and Meyer (1996)—taxes.40 Economic Perspectives
Index of crude fuel, and gt.14 Figure 8 displays the cor-
responding estimated response functions of defense
spending, total government purchases, and Rotemberg
and Woodfords (1992) real wage measure. Three key
results emerge. First, the new shock measure contin-
ues to generate a hump-shaped increase in defense
spending and total government purchases. Second,
after an increase in the new shock measure, the before-
tax version of Rotemberg and Woodfords (1992) real
wage measure briefly falls, but then rises. We conclude
that the reason for the difference between our results
and those of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) is that
we identify an exogenous increase in government
purchases in different ways. Third, even with the new
shock measure, the after-tax version of Rotemberg
and Woodfords (1992) wage measure falls in response
to a rise in government purchases. Viewed overall, we
believe that the preponderance of the evidence is
clear: Real wages fall, rather than rise, after an exoge-
nous increase in government purchases.
The response of average productivity
Figure 9 presents our estimates of the response
of average productivity to a positive shock in gov-
ernment purchases. As can be seen, average produc-
tivity falls in the manufacturing sector. Interestingly,
it falls by more in the sector where output and employ-
ment rise the most: durables manufacturing. This is
consistent with models which assume that output is
produced using a constant return to scale technolo-
gy and which abstract from varying labor effort and
capacity utilization. However, average productivity in
the business and nonfarm sectors appears to rise.
This offers support to alternative theories which allow
FIGURE 8
percent




B. Total government spending
percent
C. Manufacturing wages/private value added
percent
D. Manufacturing wages/private value added
Notes: Author’s estimations are described in text and includes the response variables, the three-month Treasury bill
interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , and the Producer Price Index of crude fuel in manufacturing industries. The
black lines are point estimates of the response functions and the colored lines are the 68 percent confidence bands
computed by the procedure in the text.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—response
variable for defense spending and total government purchases, deflator for private value added, defense purchases,
and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—Treasury bill interest rate; and U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—wages and Producer Price Index of crude fuel.
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FIGURE 9
percent
Response of average productivity to an increase in government purchases
(percentage response to WAR dummy)
A. Output per hour—manufacturing
percent
B. Output per hour—business
percent
C. Output per hour—durables
percent
D. Output per hour—nonfarm
percent
E. Output per hour—nondurables
Notes: Author estimations are described in the box. Each response is estimated using a five-variable system which
includes the response variable, the three-month Treasury bill interest rate, defense purchases, real GDP , the Producer
Price Index, and crude fuel in manufacturing industries. The black lines are point estimates of the response functions
and the colored lines are the 68 percent confidence bands computed by the procedure in the box.
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis—defense
purchases and real GDP; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System—Treasury bill interest rate; and U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics—response variable and Producer Price Index of crude fuel.
quarters ahead
quarters ahead
for increasing returns to scale, labor hoarding, and/or
variable capacity utilization. It would clearly be of in-
terest to track down the reasons for the difference in
the response of average productivity in the manufac-
turing, business, and nonfarm sectors. Unfortunately,
the data to do this are, to the best of our knowledge,
unavailable. Absent a resolution of this puzzle, we are
unwilling to say which of the competing theories is
favored by the average productivity evidence.
Conclusion
This article builds on results in Edelberg, Eichen-
baum, and Fisher (1998) to characterize the effect
of an exogenous increase in government purchases
on output, employment, real wages, and average
labor productivity. Our results shed light on the em-
pirical plausibility of alternative business cycle mod-
els. Our main finding is that after a positive shock to42 Economic Perspectives
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